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ABSTRACT
On 25 June 2019, the Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program (STP) launched the STP-2 mission from
Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 39A on a SpaceX Falcon Heavy. This groundbreaking mission carried
twenty-four space vehicles to three different orbits and achieved many firsts. As might be expected in such a
complex rideshare mission, there were many lessons learned. This paper discusses some of those lessons learned,
particularly related to managing and working with multiple organizations, performing interface control, sorting
through policy and compliance, and conducting mission assurance, fit checks, and launch integration.
STP has a 50+ year history of providing access to space for research and development satellites, most of them small
satellites. The STP-2 launch represents the latest in a long line of multi-manifest rideshare missions. Our hope is to
enlighten similar mission teams attempting large rideshare efforts across the entire space system development and
launch community.
MISSION DESCRIPTION
On June 25, 2019, a combined Department of Defense
(DoD) Space Test Program (STP) and SpaceX team
successfully launched the STP-2 mission from the
historic Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39A
(LC-39A) in Florida. The STP-2 mission marked the
third launch of SpaceX’s newest and most powerful
launch vehicle - the Falcon Heavy - and the first Falcon
Heavy launch for DoD. It also demonstrated the firstever re-use of launch vehicle first-stage boosters and
was the first multi-payload, multi-orbit mission for the
Falcon Heavy. The STP-2 mission had a complex
integrated payload stack (IPS) of 24 space vehicles
from 13 launch partner organizations separating in three
different orbits.
Goals/Objectives
Since the STP-2 mission consisted of so many launch
partners, there were many objectives at many different
levels. The space vehicle providers, experiment payload
providers, STP, the Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center (SMC), and SpaceX all had their own
objectives. Combining all the participants into a
mission where each had an opportunity to succeed was
the role of the STP and SpaceX.
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Figure 1: STP-2 Integrated Payload Stack
For SpaceX, demonstration of the Falcon Heavy
capabilities was a primary purpose. National Security
Space Launch New Entrant Certification, reusability of
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Figure 2: Co-prime and auxiliary payloads on STP-2

flight hardware, delivery of spacecraft to three different
orbits, and additional flight data for future launches
were all objectives. SMC had similar objectives to
SpaceX. STP desired successful launch of the six
COSMIC-2 spacecraft, the single DSX spacecraft, the
five ESPA-class spacecraft, and 24U of CubeSats
without spacecraft harming each other or the launch, so
each spacecraft would have the opportunity to
demonstrate technology, provide desired data, and
advance relevant knowledge. In addition, fourteen of
the experiments on board were selected through the
DoD Space Experiments Review Board (SERB); access
to space for SERB experiments is STP’s primary
mission. COSMIC-2 and DSX were designated the coprimes of the STP-2 mission by virtue of their driving
orbit requirements, with secondary priority given to the
ESPA-class spacecraft, and tertiary priority given to the
CubeSats.

Spacecraft Descriptions and Organizations
The 24 spacecraft on the STP-2 mission consisted of
the following satellites, which are also listed in Figures
2 and 3.
DSX (Demonstration and Science Experiments), from
Air Force Research Laboratory, benefits future military
and civil space assets by performing the basic research
to understand space weather phenomena, improve the
operation of space systems in the space weather
environment, and experiment with advanced techniques
that could alter these phenomena and reduce space
weather degradation of critical space assets.
COSMIC-2 (Constellation Observing System for
Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate-2), from the
Taiwanese National Space Organization (NSPO),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and SMC is a six-satellite constellation
providing next-generation global navigational satellite
system radio occultation data. Radio occultation data is
collected by measuring the changes in a radio signal as
it is refracted in the atmosphere, allowing temperature
and moisture to be determined. This data will lead to
better weather forecasting and trending for climate
change applications.

SMC and SpaceX also leveraged the STP-2 mission to
gain insight into the SpaceX process for recovering and
refurbishing first-stage boosters on the Falcon family of
launch vehicles for DoD use. Such insight will lead the
way for future technical and management teams to
balance the risks and benefits of using previously flown
rockets to meet warfighting requirements.

GPIM (Green Propellant Infusion Mission) is a NASA
mission that develops a "green" alternative to
Voelkel
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Figure 3: CubeSats on STP-2
conventional spacecraft propulsion systems. With the
green propellant, spacecraft fuel loading will be safer,
faster and much less costly. The GPIM spacecraft also
carries three other experiments from the SERB.

navigation and exploration, as well as two other
experiments from the SERB.

NPSat-1 (Naval Postgraduate School Satellite-1) hosts
two experiments built by the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) to investigate space weather and
support space situational awareness, including the
measurement of ionospheric electron density structures
that cause radio scintillations.

E-TBEx (Extended Tandem Beacon Experiment)
consists of two 3U CubeSats from University of
Michigan and observes how radio signals are distorted
by transit through the ionosphere using tones
transmitted from eight separate orbital locations (two
separate CubeSats and the six COSMIC-II satellites).
Better understanding of this distortion can lead to
improved communication techniques.

Prox-1 (Proximity Ops-1) is a microsatellite developed
by students at the Georgia Institute of Technology in
Atlanta through the AFRL’s University Nanosat
Program. Its goal was to demonstrate satellite close
proximity operations and rendezvous.

TEPCE (Tether Electrodynamic Propulsion CubeSat
Experiment), which consists of two 1.5U CubeSats
from NRL, demonstrates electrodynamic propulsion in
the space environment by using a conductive tether
strung between the two CubeSats to generate energy.

Oculus-ASR (Oculus-Attitude and Shape Recognition)
was developed by students at the Michigan
Technological University in Houghton, MI through the
AFRL’s University Nanosatellite Program. Its goal is to
provide calibration opportunities for ground-based
observers attempting to determine spacecraft attitude
and configuration using unresolved optical imagery.

PSAT (Parkinson Satellite), a 1.5U CubeSat from the
United States Naval Academy, supports global amateur
radio data relay capabilities to assist students and
researchers around the world.
BRICSat-2 (Ballistically Reinforced Communication
Satellite-2), a 1.5U CubeSat from the United States
Naval Academy, is designed to be small, affordable,
and an ideal platform for testing new space technology
such as a micro-cathode thruster system. Specifically,
on the STP-2 mission, a small, low power electric
propulsion system is being tested.

OTB (Orbital Test Bed) is a versatile, modular platform
based on a flight-proven “hosting” model, built by
General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems to test and
qualify technologies. On STP-2, OTB hosts several
payloads for technology demonstration, including a
Deep Space Atomic Clock designed and built by
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory on behalf of the
Space Technology Mission Directorate for deep space
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LEO (Launch Environment Observer) & StangSat, a 2U
CubeSat from California Polytechnic State University
and a 1U CubeSat from Merritt Island High School,
sponsored by NASA. Together these vehicles measure
3

34th Annual
Small Satellite Conference

thermal and vibration environments during launch and
transmit the information to the ground while
demonstrating Wi-Fi data transmission between
CubeSats during launch.

international partners (National Space Organization of
Taiwan and Surrey UK) for the COSMIC-2 spacecraft.
The assorted satellite manifest was managed by the
DoD Space Test Program (2018 Air Force Program
Office of the Year / Secretary Wilson Award winner),
and the Falcon Heavy was procured by SMC’s Launch
Enterprise Directorate. SMC's Remote Sensing experts
provided sensor technology for the NOAA-sponsored
COSMIC-2 mission. Ten of the 24 satellites launched
were from universities and one was from a high school,
fostering education and community involvement. The
DSX and GPIM satellites are operated out of the
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Support
Complex (RSC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, run by
SMC’s Development Corps Innovation and Prototyping
Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base. The Innovation
and Prototyping Directorate also led guest operations
for almost 4,000 visitors and 400 dignitaries who came
to view the launch.

Prometheus is a constellation of United States Special
Operations
Command
(USSOCOM)
CubeSats
developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. The
1.5U CubeSat is part a technology development and
demonstration effort to explore the viability of using a
CubeSat constellation to meet existing Special
Operation Forces mission requirements. Specifically,
these CubeSats are demonstrating the capability to
transfer audio, video, and data files from man-portable,
low-profile, remotely located field units to deployable
ground terminals using over the horizon satellite
communications.
LightSail 2, a 3U CubeSat from the Planetary Society,
demonstrates solar sailing as a method of propulsion for
CubeSats.

RIDESHARE INTEGRATION
FalconSat-7, also known as DOTSI (Deployable
Optical Telescope for Space Situational Awareness and
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) from
the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) and
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a
mission to deploy a membrane photon sieve from a 3U
CubeSat and image the Sun. This novel technique will
allow for high-resolution space-based imagery from a
small, low-cost telescope.

For a complex mission such as STP-2, effective
rideshare management is of the utmost importance. For
STP-2, rideshare integration was generally assigned to
the launch vehicle contractor. However, the STP-2
Mission Manager was also involved in this process on a
continuous basis. STP was also responsible, in
coordination with SMC and SpaceX, for designing the
mission manifest, and balancing the overarching
mission objectives with the needs of the manifested
space vehicles and payloads.

ARMADILLO (Atmosphere Related Measurements
and Detection of Submillimeter Objects) is a 3U
CubeSat to characterize the submillimeter dust particle
environment in low-Earth orbit using a 10 cm
Piezoelectric Dust Detector screen located on the
bottom face of the spacecraft. This knowledge will help
future satellite designers build better satellites.

Selecting and Accommodating Missions
The candidate list for STP missions is generated
primarily from the SERB list. The SERB looks at
potential technologies and capabilities that need to be
flown in space to enable future missions to employ
these technologies. STP offered candidates from the
SERB list the option to fly on the STP-2 mission, if
their needs were met by the mission’s characteristics,
including altitude, inclination, and the capabilities of
the launch vehicle. After the SERB payload list was
accommodated, additional missions were offered a ride,
where possible, to fill the stack and dispenser ports as
much as possible.

Partnership Composition
As a multi-manifest mission with 13 partners launching
15 satellite programs consisting of 24 space vehicles
separating in three different orbits, STP-2 was a
complicated mission. The STP-2 payloads were
assembled from a host of mission partners including the
NOAA, NASA, DoD research laboratories (Air Force
Research Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory),
universities and academia (Michigan Technological
University, University of Texas at Austin, University of
Michigan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USAFA,
Naval Post Graduate School, and Merritt Island High
School), operational DoD entities (USSOCOM), and
commercial industry (Planetary Society).
Strong
working relationships were also developed with the
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Since COSMIC-2 and DSX were designated “coprime” missions, they (and the SpaceX and SMC
objectives related to launch certification) drove mission
requirements. The remaining space vehicles needed to
be accommodated within some existing phase of the
launch, ascent, and deployment capabilities of the
mission. Managing the satellite manifest, ensuring the
suitability of the orbits, and ensuring that the launch
vehicle could deliver all satellites to usable orbits was
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part of the rideshare integration task. Managing the
rideshare integration also involved determining how
individual space vehicles could be hosted without
interfering with adjacent space vehicles on the stack
during ascent, and how the 24 satellites could be
processed at the launch site without interfering with
each other.

Responsiveness and Adaptability
The STP-2 team demonstrated adaptability and
creativity when faced with re-work of the manifest
within nine months of launch when one ESPA-class
satellite was removed from the manifest (to launch on a
different mission), and the eight CubeSat deployers
were moved from the aft section of the second stage to
two empty ESPA slots higher up on the stack (to
mitigate excessive vibration and facilitate space vehicle
/ launch vehicle compatibility). Early on in the
mission, the team also orchestrated a critical fit-check
exercise that required building satellite models out of
wood, cardboard, and 3D printed elements in some
cases. This “fit check” is described in more detail in
later sections.

To accommodate the many different missions on
STP-2, STP-2’s rideshare management team defined a
basic set of “services” provided for each space vehicle,
depending on whether they were co-primes, auxiliary
payloads (APLs), or CubeSats. This basic set of
services gave each space vehicle an idea of what
services would be provided by default and helped each
mission determine if additional services would be
required. Most space vehicle missions were satisfied
with the basic services. In some cases, the space
vehicle mission provided additional hardware to adapt
to the basic service supplied by the launch vehicle. In
these cases, the launch vehicle manager and the
individual space vehicle managers worked together to
determine who should supply the additional hardware
in a manner beneficial to both parties.

The rideshare management team also developed and
maintained the Interface Control Document (ICD) for
the overall stack. The ICD functioned as an
accommodation document, and a single place where
rideshare management was accomplished for all space
vehicles.
INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENTS

In addition to the co-prime missions and the APLs, the
CubeSat payloads also required oversight. Like the
APLs, each CubeSat deployment had to fit into some
segment of the launch profile. This was accomplished
by designing the mission to deploy the CubeSats at the
initial parking orbit, at the lowest altitude. While
CubeSat processing was somewhat simpler, since they
were sent to the Payload Processing Facility (PPF) prepackaged in their deployers, the process still required
regular coordination and communication between the
launch vehicle manager, the CubeSat integrator, and the
responsible STP-2 payload manager.

The Interface Control Document (ICD) was a
cornerstone to the STP-2 mission, and a starting point
for discussion of requirements on both the space vehicle
and the launch vehicle side. The ICD for STP-2
contained all flight and ground requirements for the
space vehicle missions riding on STP-2.
Composition
A generic ICD template was developed with
placeholders for specific space vehicle data. Each
space vehicle mission then populated their section of
the template with appropriate data.

Rideshare Program Office Composition

Some missions, such as the university satellites, easily
fit into the generic ICD template, while others with
more complexity added to the basic template. For
example, space vehicles with propulsion and specific
propulsion requirements added this information or
modified the basic template.
Furthermore, space
vehicle organizations with more specific requirements,
drawn from prior flights of their hardware, made further
additions to the generic ICD template.

The STP-2 program office employed space vehicle
mission managers who worked with each space vehicle
contractor or supplier regularly.
Some mission
managers were responsible for multiple space vehicles,
while a mission such as COSMIC-2, with multiple
space vehicles on this launch, had a single program
office mission manager. The program office space
vehicle mission managers and their Aerospace
engineering support were the STP-2 Mission Manager’s
eyes and ears for insight into all space vehicles and
their integration with the launch vehicle. Issues or
concerns could be elevated to the Mission Manager for
adjudication when necessary. The program office also
conducted internal meetings on a regular basis to enable
communications up and down the management chain.
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After the initial draft of the ICD, the Launch Vehicle
Contractor, who also functioned as the Launch System
Integrating Contractor, conducted regularly-occurring
telecons with each space vehicle mission. These space
vehicle-specific ICD telecons enabled discussion of
interface requirements in detail as well as a better
understanding of needs and capabilities on both the
space vehicle and launch vehicle side. In addition, ICD
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discussions with the entire mission team were included
in the agendas for face-to-face meetings, such as
Ground Operations Working Groups (GOWGs). Using
these forums, all team members shared issues,
questions, and knowledge to reduce the risk of lastminute “gotchas” during space vehicle processing at the
PPF.

experience continued to evolve until much later in the
mission cycle.
Managing Technical Changes and New Information
The development and integration effort for STP-2
occurred over approximately six years, and as can be
expected with such a complicated mission, technical
changes occurred frequently. Relaying these changes to
all stakeholders required good communications
between SpaceX, the STP-2 Program Office, and the
space vehicle missions. Again, regular telecons and
face-to-face meetings were conducted to ensure that all
team members were aware of technical changes as they
occurred.

The STP-2 program office was intimately involved in
all ICD discussions, and facilitated resolution of issues
and concerns from both space vehicle and launch
vehicle organizations. This active engagement by the
program office prevented issues from languishing and
thereby kept the space vehicle/launch vehicle interfaces
of STP-2 on track. Ad-hoc telecons or sessions at
GOWGs were conducted whenever needed to quickly
address concerns and drive towards resolutions, and an
action item list / issues log was maintained by the team.

One example of technical change management was
related to the use of GEVS, mentioned above.
Specifying GEVS as a random vibration test standard
allowed the space vehicle missions to maintain
schedule and move forward with testing. However, the
actual predicted environments for the new Falcon
Heavy vehicle were different than those specified in
GEVS. This led to follow-up technical evaluations by
experts and consultants on the launch vehicle and space
vehicle sides to assess impacts. In this case, multiple
delays to STP-2 due to an unrelated Falcon-9 failure
reduced the potential schedule pressure of space vehicle
random vibration testing and allowed more detailed
evaluation of the test envelopes for each space vehicle
to satisfy launch vehicle constraints.

The frequency of individual space vehicle team ICD
tag-ups with the launch vehicle contractor decreased,
eventually, as the space vehicle/launch vehicle ICD
became more defined. The ICD was revised often, with
the final version of the ICD published within a month
of launch.
Moving Forward with TBDs
In the early stages of STP-2—about mid-2013—the
new Falcon Heavy launch vehicle was still in
development. As such, detailed data on expected
launch environment was not yet available. Coupled
loads analysis still needed to be conducted, and each
mission needed to know what vibration environments to
use for design and test. Without specific vibration
predictions for the Falcon Heavy, the STP-2 Mission
Manager directed each mission to use the NASA
Goddard Standard Document GSFC-STD-7000A,
4/22/2013
General
Environmental
Verification
Standard (GEVS)1 as an interim specification, until
Falcon Heavy’s predicted environment data was
available, in the range of a year later. This enabled
each mission to keep moving along in their
development and test effort.

Other technical changes included PPF processing and
integration locations, GSE arrival scheduling, hardware
storage and removal from the PPF, and allocation of
space and facility requirements within the PPF.
Generally, these changes were managed through regular
Payload IPT meetings, with ad-hoc breakout sessions to
address impacts of changes to individual missions,
where required.
An important part of managing technical changes was
the use of a single mission manger on the launch
vehicle side, with dedicated backup personnel. On the
space vehicle contractor side, each mission provided an
integration manager as a single point of contact for
channeling questions and issues to and from the space
vehicle team. The same rationale applied to the STP-2
program office team, with mission-dedicated Air Force
and Aerospace personnel for each mission. Not only
did this ensure continuity during the six-year duration
of the mission, it also enabled quick responses to
technical changes as they arose.

Another “TBD” involved the launch base interface for
satellite fueling. While the ICD template contained the
basic data on satellite fueling requirements at the PPF,
it did not provide all the detailed interfaces and
interactions required by the Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station Range Safety team.
However, early
engagement with Range Safety in face-to-face meetings
further defined ICD requirements and responsibilities,
thus mitigating potential schedule risks. This enabled
STP-2 to clear major hurdles early, although TBDs
related to specifics of new Green Propellant ground
support equipment (GSE) design, test, and operator
Voelkel
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GOVERNMENT / COMMERCIAL WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS AND PRACTICES

reduce the need for overly complex models. This is
especially important in the effort required to complete
analysis of the integrated payload stack.

Cooperation
To ensure space vehicle testing was adequate without
placing unnecessary risk on the payloads, a significant
amount of highly technical structural engineering and
testing expertise was required. Few small satellite teams
have this level of expertise, so the STP-2 program
office augmented several of the teams with consultants
and provided modelling and testing support as required.

Accomplishing STP-2 required 15 separate program
offices and all their individual mission partners and
contractors to coalesce into one engineering team to
create an integrated payload stack where each of the
rideshare partners had to be accountable and
responsible for the success of the others as well as the
overall mission. Given the nature of the partnership,
and the fact that few team members were bound to each
other by contractual agreements, collaboration and
voluntary support across the team were an essential
requirement for success.

Schedule Slips
STP-2 encountered several schedule slips as the Falcon
Heavy development schedule unfolded and SpaceX
dealt with two Falcon-9 issues. Most of the spacecraft
teams found the additional schedule margin useful
either in navigating technical challenges or resolving
newly discovered performance issues from similar
components on orbit. But the launch slips caused
challenges, too. Missions had to track and monitor
limited shelf-life items, as well as coordinate the right
time to install flight batteries, tension any release
mechanisms, and start operational readiness
preparation. It’s best to realize up front that a new
launch vehicle’s schedule, while helpful in organizing
the sequence of work, isn’t always a good indication of
the duration of that work, since the work has never been
done before.

This common understanding set the stage for what a
Forbes article labelled a “mighty good test of
governmental cooperation.”2 Not only was the mission
a good test of cooperation between the DoD, NOAA
and NASA, but it was also a good test at the
commercial and university levels, as well. Forging and
managing this cooperation provided a lot of the lessons
learned for STP-2, and the recommendations discussed
next.
Agreements, Understanding, and Flexibility
In the absence of formal contracts between the
participants, roles and responsibilities for the team
members were established by agreements documented
in numerous memoranda of understanding. The STP-2
team found it important to start the document off with
what the agreement would accomplish, and why the
agreement was mutually beneficial to each party. If
those two facts remained constant over the course of
executing the mission, the remaining statements in the
memorandum could be modified and adjusted as
needed.

A launch slip also affects cost and occasionally
personnel depending on the duration and/or timing of
the slip. The government, commercial and university
teams STP-2 handled cost and personnel impacts
differently. Universities are essentially graduating the
workforce, so any slip is likely to a have an impact on
personnel. Continuity within the university staff,
coupled with a thorough handover to new staff and
close supervision of new students touching flight
hardware is key for success on any university program.
Cost is typically only an issue if components require
replacement; however, university programs are usually
willing to accept a significant level of risk if the
funding isn’t available.

The need for patience and flexibility cannot be
overstated. Many R&D satellite developers have small
teams, small businesses providing support, and little
ability to acquire the specialized engineering services
that large developers use. Many of the missions on
STP-2 involved university teams that employed
undergraduate-level labor, with graduate students acting
as design and engineering leads, and a single professor
providing management and continuity. Not all STP-2
team members had access to the same analysis,
modeling, or testing tools, which made establishing
standards across the teams a challenge. All this required
flexibility and support from the integrator and the
rideshare management team. In large, multi-agency
rideshare missions, teams should ideally find a way to
simplify and focus the required data information
exchange to eliminate non-essential information and
Voelkel

Government team members can typically absorb a
launch slip with some re-planning or realigning of
personnel to other projects. Personnel cost is less of an
issue for government employees, but government
contracts with mission assurance providers, consultants
and other support contractors can get costly, require
modification, and in some cases even undergo recompetition if the slip exceeds or occurs near the end of
a period of performance. Once the program is on track
it can be easier to bring government teams back on the
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project. Fiscal year budgets adjustments also create
opportunities to absorb the cost growth.

Knowledge Transfer
With limited documentation particularly early in the
mission, some verbal agreements and information
exchanged during early working group and technical
interchange meetings were lost when individuals moved
on. The team then had to put items that were
previously closed back on the table for technical
discussion and resolution with the new crew. On the
lean, quick missions performed by STP, where
meetings between engineers can take the place of more
formal documentation, it is important to keep rigorous
meeting minutes reviewed by the team and to get the
few formal documents (such as the ICD) started as soon
as possible. A byproduct of not having recorded
meeting minutes were the issues that lingered without
resolution week after week. Some integration issues
were discussed for a year or more without resolution or
assignment as action items to a lead point of contact.

Commercial businesses focus mostly on cost reduction
and are motivated to minimize non-productive effort.
Small businesses often don’t have the ability to float
employees across multiple programs like government
and large businesses do. A finite cash flow makes it
imperative to minimize labor costs and non-essential
business expenses. A lengthy launch delay for a small
commercial satellite provider may result in an
untenable situation - an inability to generate revenue or
recruit additional investors which could lead to
bankruptcy or a sell-off of the company’s assets.
Practice Differences
Other practice differences reflect the nature of the
organizations involved. Government teams prefer
methodical, detailed, specification-compliant processes
defined by contractual requirements with the
expectation that all engineering effort is subjected to a
review by a large committee of peers. Engineering
changes are expected to undergo thorough review,
potentially even at the system level, to ensure second
and third order effects are considered across the system.
Configuration changes are closely managed and
overseen by government and mission assurance
engineers.

The loss of legacy knowledge was most keenly felt at
the range for launch integration. Several of the people
performing the integration work did not have the fullmission familiarity with the stack or even their own
mission segment. It is most striking to compare the
attendance list at the STP-2 fit check with the
participants at the launch integration.
The
overwhelming majority of the original crew had left the
program by launch. Documentation of the fit check
was further limited by the fact that SpaceX uses
electronic procedures that are difficult to print out and
annotate. The as-run record remained electronic and in
SpaceX’s possession, not distributed to the team.

In contrast, commercial and educational mission
managers tend to allow engineering teams to manage
their efforts internally. The engineering teams have the
authority and oversight of change requests and the
customer typically has one or two engineers embedded
in the team who are empowered to review and accept
the design and any changes. Design reviews are often
less formal events, and more focused engineering
analysis reviews are by a smaller group of internal
peers.

One of the best methods to ensure continuity despite
personnel change was the shared document site that
held the critical documents for the team. This website,
maintained by STP and accessible to all, was a safe
repository of the latest mission data. The other best
method of maintaining team integrity and transferring
information was the effort made by each transitioning
person to individually turn over their position, data, and
knowledge. The fact that many of these professionals
took that effort seriously, and of course that everyone
didn’t transition at the same time, kept some of the
legacy knowledge alive.

The payload teams on STP-2 managed events
differently depending on whether they were a
government-contracted spacecraft, a commercial
spacecraft or a university spacecraft. What was most
important at the integrated payload stack level was
communication across the teams between the right
engineering disciplines. Multi-manifest missions
require well-understood interfaces and data is difficult
to understand without open channels of discussion
between responsible engineers on both sides of the
interface. Documentation alone should not be expected
to fully communicate the subtle complexities that need
to be understood.

Voelkel

Maintaining Communication Across the Disciplines
Teams need to have the ability to contact and discuss
the interface details between the responsible engineers
during the design process. The names and contact
information of responsible engineers need to be shared
across each of the interfaces so when questions are
thought of they can be asked by the right person and
answered by the right person - ideally before the answer
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Figure 4: Certification responsibilities for the STP-2 Integrated Payload Stack

is needed, and not once the interface has been fully
designed and adjustments are difficult.

them understand when the best opportunity might be to
communicate.

Hierarchies within teams tend to squelch such direct
communication for several reasons that are valid
concerns but can be handled appropriately once
understood and brought to light. Sending questions up
the chain and then down the chain and answers back in
the same way often leads to confusion and extraneous
discussion involving tangential issues. Managers or
system engineers with good intentions can sometimes
insert their answer and not allow the question to get to
the right person.

NAVIGATING POLICY / SAFETY
COMPLIANCE

Often management’s biggest valid concern is that a
lower level engineer will agree to an interface
requirement that results in a design change causing cost
growth or other system-level impacts outside the scope
of that engineer. The solution in this case is to make it
known that any discussion that results in cost growth or
system level impacts are only approved at the
management/system level. Another valid concern is that
these discussions between the responsible engineers
could distract them from the priorities set by
management. The schedule can help resolve these
concerns provided it’s shared across the team and
understood that if some activities are behind or in
critical periods, the answer may not necessarily be
available, or appropriate to ask at the time. Keep team
members aware of the full schedule and status to help

First, the STP-2 IPS team needed to determine the roles
and responsibilities of all the mission players. As the
launching agency, would the Air Force be required to
obtain all licenses and perform all compliance
certifications of the missions on STP-2? It seemed clear
that this was not a tenable option. The mission included
satellites from agencies as diverse as the Air Force,
NASA, commercial entities, and the government of
Taiwan. Not all Air Force policies were applicable to
all payloads riding on STP-2, and it was inappropriate
for the Air Force to request frequency licenses for
commercial or private missions. Yet, the STP-2 Air
Force team wanted to be certain that it was not
launching satellites that would violate national or
international guidelines on spectrum usage, debris,
imaging, and so forth.
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Another challenge for STP-2 was policy compliance.
With 24 satellites from 13 organizations flying on a
rocket procured by the Air Force, it took a lot of effort
to determine the compliance authorities and approvals
required to launch. Many of the ridesharing partners
were also universities new to launch, who required
guidance through the process.
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The STP-2 team then performed a “do no harm” risk
assessment as described later in this paper, not only on
aspects related to launch failure such as structural
soundness and testing, but also on policy compliance
and “do no harm” to the space environment. The results
of this assessment, along with the certification letters
for each organization were presented to the Air Force
launch approval authority for his consideration and
final launch approval. This “trust but verify” approach
was sufficient to satisfy US Air Force requirements for
launch and space safety.
While the final responsibility for licensing and policy
compliance rested with the individual satellite
organizations, the STP-2 team provided guidance and
advice to many of the organizations involved. To be
effective in this task, the team spent many hours
researching policy not only for the Air Force satellites
on the mission, but also for the university and NASA
satellites. In several cases, the team requested
clarification of unclear or undetermined policy points
from the policy owners. The team ultimately wrote a
“roadmap” for policy compliance, which is now
available online for use by the wider community.3,4

Figure 5: Sample certification letter for STP-2
payloads

DO NO HARM AND FIT CHECKS

What emerged from these early discussions was a
process by which the Air Force team divided the
mission into areas of responsibility, as shown in Figure
4 for some of the satellites. Each satellite on the
mission was responsible for its own licensing and
certification process, to include its own mission
assurance. So, the NASA satellites on the mission went
through NASA channels for debris compliance,
frequency allocation, and other certifications as needed;
similarly, the Air Force satellites went through Air
Force channels, and the private / commercial satellites
went through commercial licensing processes. The
foreign satellites followed law and policy applicable to
their satellites. Each mission, however, was required to
provide a certification letter (like the one shown in
Figure 5) to the Air Force and the STP-2 IPS mission
manager, signed by a representative of their
organization, to certify that all applicable policies were
followed, all necessary licenses were obtained, and that
the satellite was ready for launch and would “do no
harm” to the rest of the mission or the launch vehicle.
For sponsored satellites (such as the university satellites
overseen by AFRL as part of the University
Nanosatellite Program), the sponsoring agency cosigned the certification letter; for the international
partners on the mission (specifically the Taiwanese
Space Agency for the COSMIC-2 satellites), the US
partner on the mission (the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration) co-signed the letter.

Voelkel

STP-2 is the first large-scale application of Do No
Harm / Rideshare Mission Assurance, which The
Aerospace Corporation at STP pioneered and is
refining.5,6 Each space vehicle mission was responsible
for their own mission assurance. STP-2 merely
provided the ride to orbit. However, the STP-2 program
office took on the responsibility to assess do-no-harm
risks for the entire stack of space vehicle payloads. This
allowed the mission to proceed and succeed despite
different risk tolerances among the 24 satellites (from
the large ESPA-based DSX spacecraft to the university
and high school CubeSats) and at the pace of
commercial speed.
Aerospace conducted detailed and thorough analysis of
more than 800 do-no-harm items. A set of heritage dono-harm requirements was developed from prior STP
missions. This list was reviewed and updated regularly
by the STP-2 program office, and verification artifacts
or data were requested from each space vehicle mission
to ensure that do-no-harm requirements were met by all
space vehicles. Examples of do-no-harm criteria
include space vehicle compliance with:
launch
environment (random vibration, acoustics, shock, static
loads, penalty testing), contamination, electromagnetic
interference, pressure vessel requirements, electrical
inhibits, deployment, and end of life safing. A do-noharm matrix/checklist captured all space vehicle
mission partners’ compliance with the do-no-harm
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requirements. The do-no-harm document was used as
an artifact of compliance for STP-2 readiness reviews.

One example of the value of the fit check is the
discovery of access problems for installation of
omnidirectional antennas in a space vehicle area near
the dispenser’s mounting flange. The space vehicle
contractor subsequently added an additional spacer ring
to increase clearance for installing the antennas, and for
installing and torqueing bolts for the space vehicle to
dispenser flange mounting.

A particularly critical risk-reduction activity related to
the do-no-harm process was the space vehicle stacklevel fit check. The fit check was performed in the
actual PPF bay used for space vehicle/launch vehicle
processing at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. Each
space vehicle team was required to participate with
space vehicle models that were volume and mass
representatives of the actual flight vehicles. In the case
of COSMIC-2, with six space vehicles on the flight,
only two were mass- and volumetrically-accurate
models, while the other four were volumetricallyaccurate models constructed from lightweight materials.
A requirement of the “mass models” (the title mostly
used for the fit check articles) was for accurate
portrayal of appendages from each model, including
antennas or sensors that protruded from the space
vehicle bus. This accurate portrayal for the space
vehicles, especially on the APL ring, was invaluable for
practicing processing, lift, and installation on the
dispenser ring, and exercising access constraints for
adjacent space vehicles.

The fit check also enabled the actual team members
from both the space vehicle and launch vehicle side to
experience working together in a representative
workspace, thus facilitating the surfacing of questions
and issues through use of real hardware. It also
required development of a processing schedule by the
launch vehicle contractor, with estimates of the duration
of each step in space vehicle processing. This took
significant planning, as it included managing the datestaggered delivery of each space vehicle and its GSE,
the space vehicle movement into the PPF highbay, the
highbay work area setup for each space vehicle
mission, the scheduling of the overhead crane, and the
storage of GSE and related hardware before and after
its use for processing. This led to discoveries such a
need for additional pallet jacks, the need for more
storage space for space vehicle hardware, and a revision
in the space vehicle mounting sequence for the
COSMIC-2 upper dispenser rings.

The STP-2 program facilitated development of mass
models, especially for university satellites, where a
non-flight model did not exist, or would have been
difficult to develop under the university or lab resource
constraints. For the APL ring, a series of representative
mass models were developed that could simulate
multiple space vehicles through addition of small
balance weights, and appropriate simulated appendages.
In addition, these mass models could be flown on the
launch vehicle if a space vehicle were de-manifested
late in the mission cycle, to avoid new launch vehicle
loads and control analyses. In other cases, space
vehicle contractors also possessed non-flight space
vehicles that were used for the fit check, and could be
flown as mass models, if the need arose.

Initially, space vehicle processing was planned for the
West Bay of the SpaceX PPF. However, in the
timeframe of the Fit Check, the West Bay was
processing flight hardware for an ISS resupply mission.
Therefore, the Fit Check occurred in the PPF East Bay,
which is not identical in layout to the planned
processing area.
Ultimately, the actual space
vehicle/launch vehicle processing occurred in the same
bay (East Bay) as the fit check. This was fortuitous,
since the space vehicle teams were familiar with this
workspace.

The fit check proved to be a success, resulting in a
number of lessons learned, and the ability to mitigate
problems or issues that might have become technical or
schedule risks to the mission during actual space
vehicle/launch vehicle processing. Over one hundred
lessons learned were consolidated from individual
space vehicle missions, the launch vehicle contractor,
and the STP-2 program office. These lessons learned
were reviewed by the entire team, and follow-up
actions delegated for their implementation.

Voelkel

In summary, the importance of the fit check cannot be
overstated, especially for rideshare missions. In the
case of STP-2, the actual space vehicle/launch vehicle
processing at the PPF would likely have incurred
numerous technical issues, and the launch schedule
could have been impacted had a Fit Check been
omitted.

11

34th Annual
Small Satellite Conference

LAUNCH
SpaceX performed the IPS integration in the LC-39A
Hangar, mounting six COSMIC-2 spacecraft, five
ESPA-class auxiliary payloads, and eight Poly Picosat
Orbital Deployers (i.e., 24U of CubeSats) on three
SpaceX dispenser rings. The DSX spacecraft topped the
stack creating an IPS totaling approximately 6000 kg.
After launch and second engine cutoff, the Oculus
spacecraft and CubeSats were separated at
approximately 28.5° inclination in a 300 x 860 km
orbit. Then, after another second stage burn, the
remaining four auxiliary spacecraft and the six
COSMIC-2 spacecraft were separated at approximately
24° inclination in a 720 x 720 km orbit. After the third
and fourth second engine burns, the DSX spacecraft
was separated at approximately 42° inclination in a
6,000 x 12,000 km orbit. Finally, SpaceX performed a
fifth second stage burn with the Falcon Heavy. The
STP-2 mission flawlessly executed a six-hour
deployment sequence, successfully placing 24 satellites
in three unique orbits. All satellites were ultimately
contacted by their respective agencies for mission
operations.

Figure 6: STP-2 launch (photo courtesy of
NASA)
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CONCLUSION
STP-2 achieved many firsts: in addition to being the
first DoD and Air Force use of the Falcon Heavy launch
vehicle, it represented the first DoD reuse of Falcon
boosters. It was also the first wide-scale application of
STP “do no harm” processes, the first DoD test case for
rideshare certification policy, and – with 13
organizations from military, civil, university,
commercial, and foreign organizations involved – the
most complex launch mission ever attempted by the Air
Force.
STP-2 was a multi-nation, multi-agency, multiorganization rideshare effort that served as a pathfinder
for how government, industry, academia, and
international partners can work together on multimanifest missions. It is the team’s hope that by
applying some of the lessons learned reflected in this
document – by establishing good communications and
mutual understanding up front, by implementing strong
rideshare management techniques and interface control,
by understanding policy compliance and do-no-harm
considerations, and by facilitating knowledge transfer
within and among payload teams – other missions can
achieve the success STP experienced on its first Falcon
Heavy mission.

Voelkel
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